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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to uncover the relationship between 
Japan’s prefectural budgetary procedures and incrementalism. Specifi­
cally, I will measure the statistical correlations between my dependent 
variable, demonstrated budgetary flexibility, and a number of proposed 
explanatory variables. My hypothesis is that within Japan’s prefectures 
the departmental budget-shares do not change much, on the average, from 
year to year; that they are incremental.
Both the computer model and the assorted variables which have been 
incorporated into this analysis were extracted from Robert Rickards’ 
doctoral dissertation. Although this thesis does not offer an explicit 
comparative study, it does include some cross-national summaries which 
may be useful in some future comparative analysis.
The results of this study suggest that within some prefectures 
dynamic, non-incremental processes are in operation. Yet these dynamic 
processes are not as significant when statistical averages of Japan’s 
prefectural budgetary-shares are calculated.
JAPAN’S PREFECTURAL BUDGETARY 
PROCESS: AN INCREMENTAL ANALYSIS
CHAPTER I
INCREMENTALISM: ITS ORIGIN AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The act of budgeting finite resources among infinite demands has 
necessitated that governments develop priority-setting frameworks. In 
their attempts to formulate such rational budgetary priorities many 
theorists have concluded that incremental decision-making is the best 
available routine to follow.
Within this thesis I will investigate the relationship between Japan's 
prefectural budgetary strategy and incremental procedures. Both the con­
troversy surrounding such strategies and the pervasiveness of these incre­
mental routines in Japan's prefectural governments will be analyzed.
The following study answers two questions concerning the incrementalist 
controversy. First, how much does budget-share stability among Japan's 
prefectures fluctuate? Second, under what conditions are the greatest 
deviations from existing budget-share patterns most likely to occur? The 
subsequent answers to these questions will indicate the reliance of Japan's 
prefectures on budgetary strategies which produce incremental change. The 
findings will also suggest how a government may, most easily, transfer 
resources across departmental categories. The organizational complexity 
exhibited in the prefectures, and other environmental and political variables, 
will be demonstrated in this paper to be related to a particular prefecture';s 
ability to shift resources among various departments.
Contemporary political scientists have offered a number of incremental 
models to the interested reader. Most of these studies have concluded
2
3.that the spending priorities of a government's administrative units are 
quite inflexibile, and thus incremental, at the final stages of the 
resource allocation decision-making process.^" While most political 
scientists agree that incrementalism is an important factor when explain­
ing the stability of the administrative ® | t f s budget shares ,'.they do 
offer a number of alternative explanations concerning the extent of
2
dynamic non-incremental forces at lower levels of the budgetary process.
The significance of incremental techniques on the federal budget of 
the United States has been investigated since the 1950s. Charles Lindbloom 
has described incremental budgeting as both a valid and rational way to 
reach policy decisions. An administrator, states Lindbloom, ". . . would 
rely heavily on the record of past experiences with small policy steps
3
to predict the consequences of similar steps extended into the future." 
Lindblbbm's administrator is a man with limited knowledge, information, 
and ability who makes policy choices by rationally making marginal adjust­
ments in past successful politics to formulate current budgetary strategies. 
He points out that most political or public policies represent a contin­
uing attack on ever-present problems, and, therefore, there is always a
Robert C. Rickards, "Non-Routine Decision-Making: A Study of
Demonstrated Flexibility in West German Municipalities' Budgetary Priority 
Setting" (Diss. University of Michigan, 1980), p. 242. Rickards' findings 
run contrary to most other budget theorists conclusions in that his 
study revealed some budget-share changes up to 17 percent from one year to 
the next. Therefore, the final stage of the resource allocation decision­
making process is not necessarily as inflexible as many budgetary theorists 
conclude.
2
The term "budget-share" refers to the proportional distribution of 
a prefecture's budget to its departmental categories.
3
Charles E. Lindbloom, "The Science of Muddling Through" in Public 
Administration: Concepts and Cases, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co.,
1976), p. 151.
4precedent to follow and adjust.
Another aspect of the Lindbloom definition concerning policy-making 
is that policy problems are fragmented and dealt with individually, 
rather than comprehensively. Both Lindbloom*s emphasis on historical 
precedent and fragmentation have been incorporated into the many 
contemporary budgetary models available to the reader of incremental 
phenomena.
John Crecine declares, much like Lindbloom, that the decision-maker 
cannot possibly deal with the budget if historical precedent and frag­
mented methods of analysis are not adopted. Crecine states that the 
immense complexity inherent in the budgetary process necessitates that 
methods aimed at simplifying the annual budget be adopted. In Crecine’s 
research, the mayor illustrated this policy strategy by breaking down 
the balanced budget problem into a set of more manageable subproblems. 
The mayor also relies on last year’s budget when formulating his new 
budget.
11. . . a  logical way to proceed in solving the complex budgeting
problems is to take last year’s solution (current appropriation)
and modify it in light of the change in available resources and
the change in municipal problems and their available solutions,
4
to obtain this year’s solution."
The lack of both perfect knowledge and information in the budgetary 
process, and the subsequent use of "aids to calculation", has been 
acknowledged by many budgetary theorists as the most rational method 
available for easing the complexity of the decision-making
4
John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem Solving: A Computer
Simulation of Municipal Budgeting, (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1969).
5
5process.
An article by Otto Davis, M. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky
describes the effects of the executive on budgetary procedures which
produce incremental change at the federal level in similar terms to
CrecineTs analysis of the mayor's effect at the municipal level of govern- 
£
ment. One important difference is that it is not necessary to balance 
the federal budget. Both Davis ejt. al. and Crecine attribute traditional 
bureaucratic roles to the chief executive. The mayor and his staff's duty 
towards the budget is to fulfill the legal obligation of submitting a 
balanced budget to council for consideration. A balanced budget is of 
primary importance to the mayor. A mayor who faces a deficit may reduce 
agency requests by following a series of search routines designed to 
identify the most feasible solution to the budgetary problem.
Davis e_t. al. also perceive of the chief executive's role in the 
budget as including the ability to manipulate agency requestsrin order to 
promote executive priorities and reduce the deficit. The president's and 
his staff’s concern with balancing the budget is less crucial to their 
decision-making process than it is to the mayor. An annual federal deficit 
is an accepted fact in the United States and is not as damaging as it is 
to municipalities, due to the federal government’s ability to create money 
and control monetary policies. Because of less stringent spending restraints
Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 11-17. Wildavsky defines aids to 
calculation as those mechanisms which help to generate meaningful decisions 
out of a very complicated process. ’'Satisficing” (to satisfy and suffice), 
"guestimating", simplifying, and incrementally adjusting are the four 
major components of Wildavsky's aids to calculation.
£
Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, nA Theory of 
the Budgetary Process” in The American Political Science Review, (September, 
1966), p. 529.
6it is reasonable to assume that national level expenditure patterns will 
display less incrementalism than those for subnational governments.
John Crecine*s and Aaron Wildavsky!s writings indicate that in 
the United States, at both the municipal and federal levels, agencies 
attempt to amplify and preserve their budget appropriations and status. 
Robert Kharasch has described this characteristic as the "institutional 
imperative". Every action or decision of an institution must be intended 
to keep the institutional machinery working.^ Kharasch states that it 
is an atmosphere of survival and growth which pervades the entire American 
public bureaucracy. Both Crecine and Wildavsky have drawn the conclusions 
that the institutional imperative is demonstrated by agencies at both 
the municipal and federal levels of government.
John Crecine and Aaron Wildavsky have described the budgetary process 
as being an incremental procedure. They assumed that public policy­
making was therefore incrementally organized.
"By focusing on the stability of agencies structures, and on the 
longevity of most programs, quantitative researchers have concluded 
that budgeting and public policy are incremental because an inecrt ; 
bureaucracy has sunk so much into existing programs that to start
g
from scratch is too disruptive, wasteful, and impractical."
This argument for considering public policy as nessarily incrementally 
organized has been criticized by some contemporary budget theorists.
Robert Kharasch, The Institutional Imperative: How to Understand
the United States Government and Other Bulky Objects, (New York: 
Charterhouse Books, 1973), p. 24.
William L. Morrow, Public Administration: Politics, Policy, and
the Political System, (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 350).
Two such budget theorists are Peter Natchez and Irving Bupp.
In their study, Natchez and Bupp defend Wildavsky's position that 
budgeting is incremental by nature. The issue which they address is the 
claim by Wildavsky and others that the budgetary process produces clear- 
cut conclusions concerning public policy. Natchez and Bupp lay the blame 
for this erroneous claim not in the logic of the political scientists' analysis 
but in the method of inquiry they employed. Wildavsky and others concen­
trated on agencies and departments as the unit of analysis. Drawing a set 
of equations from this data revealed the great stability (incrementalism) 
of the budgetary process. Natchez and Bupp contend that:
". . . because administrative categories have formed the basis of
budgeting analysis, the entire process in which public policy is
9produced has been obscured."
Natchez and Bupp argue that political scientists who follow the quanti­
tative approach, such as Wildavsky, are victims of its own theoretical and 
statistical precision. They believe that in order to understand the role 
of policy choices in the budgetary process the level of analysis must be 
shifted from agencies, departments, and ministries to programs.
"It is this variation in the competitive success of alternative pro­
grams, rather than the cognitive process of decision-makers, which is 
central to the politics of public administration."^
9
Irving C. Bupp and Peter B. Natchez, "Policy and Priority in the 
Budgetary Process," in The American Political Science Review, (September, 
1973), pp. 951-952.
~^ Ibid., p. 955. Natchez and Bupp illustrate the dynamic policy proce­
dures operating at lower levels of the budgetary and decision-making pro­
cess by formulating a case study of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In 
their final analysis they substantiate their initial hypothesis: The
success of the AEC weapons program and the failure of other programs was 
due to the aggressive roles of the division directors at the lower levels 
of the decision-making process.
8This thesis analyzes the budget-share stability of Japan's prefectual 
departments. Natchez has stated that my method of analysis may obscure 
some of the public policy process. But just as department heads must 
choose among different levels of funding for various programs in formu­
lating the department's budget request, so must the chief executive choose 
among different funding levels for the various departments in formulating 
his overall budget proposals. So studying how prefectures allocate funds 
among various departments still captures important elements of the policy­
making process. Furthermore, while there may not be comparable programs 
in all prefectures, there are comparable departments (due to laws providing 
for uniform structures of local government in Japan). So by choosing the 
department level of analysis one is able to get away from verbal descriptions 
of single cases and apply large-group statistics to the study of 46 pre­
fectures’ budgetary behavior.
By relying on statistical data that has been drawn from the final 
stages of the budgetary process, I have ignored the potential for dynamic 
and aggressive competition at lower operating levels of the prefectures' 
budget strategy. Both this weakness and the loss of detail resulting from 
the trade off of single case descriptions for large group statistics must 
be aknowledged. Yet the structural similarity of Japan's prefectural 
departments and the empirical validity of large-group statistics overweigh 
the critisicms which Natchez and Bupp have directed at budget analyses 
which rely on administrative categories for their methodological approach.
Lance LeLoup and William Moreland have supported Natchez and Bupp's 
conclusion. Their case study of the Office of Management and Budget and 
the Department of Agriculture concludes that the component stages of the 
annual appropriation process are more dynamic than the overall results
indicate. They identified "pork barrel" politics and interest group 
support as being important factors in agency growth.
"To obtain substantial non-incremental increases in programs and
budgets, an agency must attain a position of political strength
(with support inside and outside of government) to justify a large 
..11increase.
The pervasiveness of the institutional imperative within the American bureau­
cracy, at all levels of government, does suggest that the component stages 
of the appropriation process are less incremental than the final results 
would indicate.
Incremental explanations have been., frequently relied upon by budgetary 
analysts to account for the budgetary behavior they observed. Due to their 
simplicity and explanatory capacity, these incremental explanations have
become popular in a number of case studies concerning budgeting in United
12 13 1AStates cities, local school systems, American states, national govern-
15 , . . 16ments, and international organizations.
"^Lance T. LeLoup and William Moreland, "Agency Strategies and 
Executive Review: The Hidden Politics of Budgeting," in Public
Administration Review, (January, 1978), p. 239.
12Thomas Anton, Budgeting in Three Illinois Cities, (Urbana, Illinois: 
Institute of Governmental and Public Affairs, 1964).
13Donald A. Gerwin, Budgeting Public Funds: The Decision Process in
an Urban School District, (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin, 1969).
14Thomas Anton, The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois,
(Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1966).
15John Creighton Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics, 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977).
16Francis Hoole, Brian Job, and Harvey Tucker, "Incremental Budgeting 
and International Organizations," in the American Journal of Political 
Science, (May, 1976), pp. 273-301.
10
It is important for the reader of this paper to understand my 
definition of incrementalism. The term indicates that prefectual depart­
ments are allocated across-the-board, fixed percentage increases in 
spending appropriations, resulting in little or no change in budget- 
shares among departments. Incrementalism suggests that little budgetary 
flexibility is demonstrated among a prefecture’s budget-shares. It is 
not an applied strategy in budgetary decision-making, but rather, incrementa­
lism is the result of a kind of bureaucratic momentum.
The incremental model of budgetary analysis has become popular due 
to both its ability to account for historical expenditure patterns and 
the theoretical vacuum which it filled. Previous normative theories of 
budgeting could not adequately explain the stability and inflexibility of 
budget shares among administrative units. Classical economic theories 
relied heavily on the a priori validity of their normative assumptions.
These assumptions basically stated that government ought to be aware of 
and responsive to citizens’ changing wants and needs.
Contemporary studies have indicated that these assumptions are not 
followed in reality. Charles Lindbloom’s attempt to replace these a priori 
principles with more empirical techniques has generated great support 
within the field of political science. To increase the manageability of 
resource allocation, both fragmentation and historical precedent have been 
accepted as the best tools available.
Despite their widespread acceptance and demonstrated predictive 
qualities, incremental budgeting routines have been surrounded by contro­
versy. One significant reason for this conflict of opinion is the lack 
of unified and popularly accepted boundaries between incremental and non- 
incremental change. This lack of unifying propositions is depicted by
11
the many different explanations of incrementalism available to the 
student of budgetary analysis. What one author perceived of as a 
large incremental change may be considered as an insignificant change 
by another. Whereas Richard Fenno defines less than a twenty percent 
increase in U.S. federal agency requests as a large incremental change,^ 
James Danziger, in his study of British county-borough expenditures, 
defines a non-incremental change as being over three percent of last
,1 ,18year s level.
Although this lack of unifying propositions. has hindered the compara­
bility of many budget analyses, it has not impeded this study. Throughout 
my research, I have neither emphasized the percentage change in total 
expenditure bases nor have I defined incrementalism in a percentage-cate­
gorical way. Rather, my research concentrates on whether adjustments 
made in departmental budget shares occur on a fixed-percentage across-the- 
board basis.
Within this chapter I have considered the views of some budgetary 
theorists concerning the significance of incremental techniques in budget­
ing.. Agreement exists among these writers regarding the strong incremental 
characteristics exhibited in the final appropriation stages of the 
budgetary strategy. The basic argument among some theorists concerns 
the appropriate method for measuring and identifying the process in which 
public policy is produced. I have defended the departmental level of 
analysis as an empirically constructed method of research. Allocations to 
departments are decision outputs just as much as are allocations to pro­
grams. Moreover, the department level of analysis is the most central 
measure for the question which is addressed in this thesis. Does budgetary 
resource reallocation occur across the prefectural departments of Japan
12
of just within them?
Chapter II will focus on the budgetary strategy exhibited within 
Japan’s prefectures. The chapter will also contain a descriptive analysis 
of Japan’s federal budget strategy and the important role of balance 
to this decision-making process. Due to the lack of available information 
on Japan’s prefectual budgetary behavior, I will - - by necessity - - 
rely on Japan’s national budgetary characteristics when developing this 
analysis.
In Chapter II the research strategy will be presented. This chapter 
will also contain a description of the computer model and variables employed 
in my analysis. Chapter IV will focus on my findings concerning inter- 
prefectural variations in budget-share stability. Some of the more 
significant explanatory variables tested in this chapter will be subjected 
to correlation and regression runs in order to identify their relationship 
with the independent variable, budgetary flexibility. In Chapter V the 
conclusions to my study will be presented. This concluding chapter will 
also contain some discussion suggesting future applications of the 
evidence revealed in this thesis to budgetary questions.
CHAPTER II
JAPAN'S BUDGETARY BEHAVIOR
John Campbell's research on Japan's national budgetary strategy has
19been instrumental to this analysis. Much of his work emphasizes the 
cultural significance of Japan's exhibited budgetary behavior and, in 
this.respect, his findings are readily adaptable to the prefectural level 
of analysis. Campbell suggests that there is an interwoven connection in 
Japan between its culturally supported norms and organizational strategy.
This view has been sustained by a sociological study conducted by Chie 
Nakane.^
The pronounced emphasis within Japanese society on consensus and 
balance has inhibited the development in Japan's bureaucracy of the 
"institutional imperative". This characteristic of American bureaucratic 
agencies and departments is not applicable to Japan's budgetary behavior.
John Campbell has revealed that in Japan's federal bureaucracy, and through­
out its society, the emphasis on consensus and balance outweighs a ministry's 
desire to increase its proportional slice of the budget pie. While a 
ministry may not seek to increase budget shares at the expense of others,
19Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics and John Creighton 
Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu" in Modern Japanese Organization and 
Decision Making, ed. by Ezra Vogel (Berkely: Univ. of California Press,
1975), pp. 75 - 100.
20Chie Nakane, Japanese Society, (Berkely: Univ. of California
Press, 1970), pp. 144 - 146. Chie Nakane.indicates that the Japanese 
compulsion with balance in their interpersonal relations and organizational 
structures is directly attributed to cultural norms.
13
14 ’
it will insist on a fixed-percentage, across-the-board increase. This 
priority within Japan of equitable treatment and harmony is an important 
factor in understanding the strong role or incrementalism in Japan's 
budgetary decision-making.
John Campbell's analysis of Japan's budgetary process indicates 
that its budget-shares are even more stable than are those of the 
United States, France, and Britain (Table I). The term budget shares 
may be defined as the proportion of the entire budget which is allocated 
to the various ministries and their departments. The great stability 
between Japan's ministerial budget-shares is depicted in Table I. Between 
the years 1961 and 1970 Japan's ministerial budget-shares, in more than 
half the cases (57 percent), altered their budget shares less than five 
percent annually. Whether this stability is similarly demonstrated at 
Japan's prefectural level will be considered later in this thesis. Suffice 
it to say at this point that Campbell's findings should be approximated 
in this study if incremental techniques . are as widely applicable and 
culturally supported in Japan as Campbell assumes.
Campbell states that the great stability of budget shares in both 
ministries and bureaus springs from the cultural significance in Japan 
of balance and specifically to the norm of "baransu". Baransu does not 
refer to a concept which is easily.identifiable in western cultures.
"The word did not refer to equalizing environmental revenues and
expenditures as in American budget terminology; it seemed to mean
21
evenhandedness or equitable treatment."
The concept of baransu is revealed by Campbell as being closely related
21Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu", p. 73.
15
to the organizational behavior exhibited in Japanese politics and in 
society in general. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan (a 
mass or umbrella party covering many small, competing interest groups) 
is a primary example of how the norm of baransu permeates Japan’s organi­
zational strategy. Although the LDP has controlled the Diet since 1955 
and has a virtual monopoly of governmental power, the norm of baransu 
demands that the opinions of small factions and opposing parties be heard 
and acted upon. Consensus is a key strategy in both Japanese society 
and within its specific organizational structures.
Kono Kazuyuki, a former Japanese vice-minister of finance, states 
that balance among expenditures is an important criterion used by the
Budget Bureau when reviewing ministerial requests for budget appropria- 
22tions. In Japan’s budgetary strategy, expenditures in the same category
or similar items are balanced. A closely related idea in American budgeting
23
procedures has been defined by Aaron Wildavsky as "fair share".
Baransu, applied to the budgetary process, results in the avoidance 
of any form of cost-benefit analysis since the quality and efficiency of 
a particular program, bureau, or ministry are not considered. Campbell"' 
repeatedly draws the conclusion that Japan's budgetary techniques are 
strongly based on incremental techniques.
"Balancing represents avoidance of comparisons among programs and their 
merits by implying that simply because they are similar they should
22Hugh Patrick, "Cyclical Instability and Fiscal-Monetary Policy Nin 
Postwar Japan," in The State and Economic Enterprises in Japan, ed. by 
William Lockwood (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press. 1965), pp. 595-597.
23Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 17. Wildavsky 
describes fair share as more than just the base amount of expected agency 
appropriations. Fair share denotes the expectations that an agency will 
receive some proportion of the extra funds, if any, which are to be 
increased over the base of the various governmental agencies.
16
Table I
Distribution of Yearly Change-In-Shares, Four Nations
(Unit: Percent)
Period 0-5% 5-10% 10-15% 15-20%
Over
20% Total
Japan 1961-1970 57.1 19.2 13.6 5.0 5.6 100.5
France 1960-1969 49.5 25.7 12.4 0.0 12.4 100.00
United States 1959-1968 37.4 29.7 14.2 9.0 9.7 100.00
Great Britain 1960-1970 16.9 34.9 14.1 14.1 19.8 99.8
Notes: This table was extracted from John Campbell’s Contemporary Japanese
Budget Politics, p. 98. The original source of this information was 
taken by Campbell from Aaron Wildavsky’s Budgeting, (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1975), p. 242.
17
24receive the same or equivalent budgets."
From Wildavsky1s perspective, baransu may be considered an aid 
to calculation since it eases the massive decision-making burden on 
budgetary participants. A weakness of such incremental aids to calcu­
lation is that the efficiency and effectiveness of administrative units 
are not systematically measured. Budget-shares within and between 
ministries are balanced for the sake of balance and not in terms of the 
most good for the least cost. Therefore baransu, like fair share, contains 
dysfunctional aspects, efficiency is sacrificed for simplicity.
According to Campbell, Japan’s national budget is more affected by 
incremental techniques than its U.S. counterpart.
"The Japanese budgetary system seems more routinzed, less program­
matic, and more likely to produce the same old decisions year 
after year than the budgetary systems of the west. Indeed this 
impression is strengthened when one considers such distinctively 
Japanese., elements as the norm of "balance" which works against
changes, or the unusual degree of penetration by the majority party
.,25organization into the budget system.
Incremental aids to calculation have been formalized within Japan's budget
stipulations. A Japanese law restricts each ministry’s budget request
to not more than 125 percent of last year’s appropriation. This potential
increase includes cost of living and wage hikes within the ministries
2 6
and is therefore considerably less than a 25 percent increase.
2 ACampbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu," p. 76.
25Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics, p. 275/ Campbell 
states that the LDP’s effect on the budgetary process has tended to increase 
the stability of the ministries1 budget-shares.
O C
Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu," p. 81. The development within 
the ministries of new programs is also funded by this potential 25 percent 
annual increase. It should be noted that this maximum alloted appropriation 
request is frequently not authorized.
18
This maximum percentage increase stipulation is also applied within a
ministry’s bureaus: thus the budgetary process in Japan’s national
government is, by law, incrementally organized. The budgets of United
States agencies are more influenced by political support in the Congress
27and Executive, and particularly by appropriation subcommittees.
The ministry of Finance's (MOF) voluntary reduction of its own
power in planning the budget illustrates the particular significance of
balance and consensus within Japan’s bureaucracy. To avoid conflict
with the LDP and to increase harmony among political and bureaucratic
participants, the MOF relegated control over individual program spending
to the experts in the spending ministries and the LDP by 1970. Instead
of allocating funds to specific policy areas inside the ministries, as was
the case in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the MOF in 1970 gave such discretionary
28
power to the LDP and spending ministries. Another reason for the MOF 
to abdicate some of its budget-making authority and increase the consensus 
among budgetary participants is the formidable power of the LDP. The 
Liberal Democratic Party has ruled Japan from the 1950’s to the present, 
and seems likely to do so for the indefinite future.
The MOF voluntarily reduced its power over microbudgeting decisions 
in order to increase the consensus among all involved in the budgeting 
strategy. This action reveals the pronounced difference between the 
Japanese and American bureaucracies. Japanese budgetary behavior does 
not seem to follow the same "institutional imperatives" which Robert
27Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, Congress, The Bureaucracy, and 
Public Policy, (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1980), p. 67.
2 8Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu, "pp. 96-97.
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Kharasch has defined as the basic drive of all American bureaucratic 
agencies and committees. By inhibiting the aggressiveness and competi­
tive qualities found in American bureaucratic organizations, the Japanese 
system of budgeting should demonstrate more incrementalism than does 
the U.S. system.
John Campbell has emphasized the strong incrementalism exhibited 
within Japan's resource allocation process. While Japan does appear 
to contain culturally supportive norms as bureaucracy, it may be less 
pronounced than Campbell contends. A reason for suggesting this point 
is that Campbell analyzed a single case (Japan’s national government) and 
thus the norm of baransu and its relationship with budgetary behavior is 
less statistically significant than a multivariate analysis would be.
By investigating the relationship between budget-share stability and 
46 Japanese prefectural governments, I would expect to be able to 
explain this relationship with more statistical authority.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH STRATEGY
Within this chapter, I will discuss the construction of both my 
research strategy and my adoption of Robert Rickards’ computer model.
To retain a high degree of intersubjective validity, I have duplicated the 
basic format of Rickards’ doctoral dissertation. Intersubjective validity 
refers to the empirical and logical relationship found between two models 
or comparative studies. By duplicatinglRidkardsT’ variable list and 
adopting his computer model, I have attempted to retain a strong empirical 
base for future comparative analyses. Rickards' description of Germany's 
municipal budget formulation was instrumental to the development of this 
analysis.
This research framework is quite simple, the advantages of construct­
ing such a model are twofold. First, the large number of prefectures 
studied in this paper (forty-six) would be beyond the scope of a researcher’s 
time if all possible input information were included in the development 
of this model. Second, fewer assumptions are involved and therefore the 
theoretical framework is stronger.
Adopting such a simple model does have its drawbacks. A trade-off 
of explanatory capacity for this simplicity must be aknowledged. Yet 
by retaining the computer model which Rickard’s previously employed, I 
can be more confident of its predictive ability and intersubjective compara­
bility. Therefore, for this study, the advantages of adopting a simple 
computer model and research strategy outweigh the disadvantages of not
20
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employing a more intricate format.
The explicitness of mathematics and computer language affords the 
researcher a strong, unambiguous base for his analysis. By comparing 
46 prefectures observed budgetary behavior with the computer's predicted 
outputs:: the model adopted in this thesis will measure budget-share 
stability.
"Process models of budget-making behavior are useful,in measuring
intercity variance in budget share stability. They also help to
explain why, once a city has cut its fiscal pie in a particular
pattern in a given year, it continues to slice successive fiscal
29pies in about the same proportions-;*"
The weakness of such models lies in their inability to account for 
deviations from the stable-share patterns. Yet Rickards has pointed out 
that this weakness may be overcome by first defining such deviation as 
demonstrated budgetary flexibility and then by subjecting this variable 
to analysis in a regression model. Demonstrated budgetary flexibility 
(DBF) is measured as the absolute value of a pr.ef.e.ckujejjs deviation from 
the ideal stable-share rule' summed across* all departments *; divided \ 
by two, for a specific prefecture in a specific year. In this study I 
intend to measure DBF and explain inter-prefecture differences in DBF.
By defining the explanatory variables which most affect the DBF of pre­
fectures, this study can help budgetary participants understand the rela­
tionship between stable-share rules and certain political and geographical 
characteristics of the governments under observation.
The proposed explanatory variables tested in this paper were also 
adopted, with some modifications, from Rickards' dissertation. The purpose
29Rickards', op. cit. , p. 38.
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of these explanatory variables is to explain the deviations from stable 
budget-shares. This is done by measuring interprefectural variation in 
demonstrated flexibility.
Six prefectural expenditure categories were constructed within 
my research strategy. These categories include some which represent 
a compilation of several departments. For example, the category agricul­
ture also includes the departments of forestry and fisheries, commerce and 
manufacturing. Although some departments were combined under one category 
this research still contains a sizeable number of different categories 
with a great deal of variation both over prefectures and time. Tables 
II and III depict the great variations which occur in Japan's prefectural 
expenditure categories. Large differences were uncovered between one 
prefecture and another in both the short (506 cases) and long (46 averaged 
mean cases) runs. These tables indicate that my data base includes a 
great deal of prefectural expenditure variations and that dynamic and 
pronounced differences within Japan’s forty-six prefectures are in 
operation.
The choice of Japan as the geographic setting and of the decade 1967-
1976 as the time period for this study was based both on personal interest
and data availability. The chance to apply Rickard’s computer model to
a non-European industrialized nation was a major factor in choosing this
country for my analysis. Another important reason for studying Japan was
its relatively small number of prefectures, yet large enough to apply large-
group statistics. Because there are only 46 prefectures, I was able to
30
include the entire nation’s prefectural governments in this study.
30The large number of municipalities in Germany and the great variation 
in their population sizes persuaded Robert Rickards to analyze the 105 
cities which contained at least 50,000 citizens in the 1965 census. My 
study included all Japanese prefectures except for Okinawa which had not 
been re-incorporated into Japan until after my time series began.
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The time period was chosen because of the consistent statistical
information available during this ten-year time series. All of the
raw data for this quantitative model was extracted from the Japan
31
Statistical Yearbook. Alterations in reported data occur frequently 
in the years before 1967 and after 1976. The time series 1967-1976 
was chosen because the data was consistent over these years.
Several negative consequences concerning the chosen geographic and 
temporal settings for this study may exist. The first potential weak­
ness was my reliance on the accuracy of the statistical yearbooks. Some
obvious errors were detected, but most of my statistical data were by
32necessity, accepted as fact.
The second potential weakness was a gap in the time series. For 
whatever reasons, the Japanese government combined the 1973 and 1974 statis­
tical yearbooks into one volume. While most of this volume included 
both 1973 and 1974 data, some categories —  such as net prefectural product —  
excluded the 1973 figures. To remedy this deficiency, the missing 1973 
categories were estimated through linear interpolation. The remainder 
of this chapter will focus on the development of the computer model and 
the relationship between DBF and prefectural budget share patterns.
John Crecine envisioned applying his intricate and sophisticated 
computer model, with appropriate modifications, to the resource allocation 
decision-making process in other cities and governmental units. "The
Japan Government Press, Japan Statistical Yearbook.
32The obvious errors were detected in such variables as party seats. 
Since both the total number of seats and the various parties’ proportion 
of this total were available for scrutiny: it was possible to check the
sum of the different parties’ seats against the total number of seats. 
Such errors were infrequent but they do illustrate the potential for 
institutionalized errors in my data set.
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Table II
Maximum-Minimum-Mean of J ap an ’ s 
Expenditure Categories
(Short-Run = 506 cases*)
Expenditure Category Maximum Minimum Mean Std. Dev
General Administration 128,711.00 1,540.00 10,423.80 13,881.40
Welfare 373,214.00 2,587.10 20,363.50 33,469.20
Agriculture 222,348.00 4,927.78 28,680.70 23,122.80
Public Works 387,913.00 5,753.20 38,537.20 45,277.80
Police and Fire Protection 318,246.00 1,511.77 13,261.30 27,318.30
Education 454,876.00 8,848.70 51,245.00 52,587.10
Gwappe (sum of the above 1,691,740.00 22,163.00 162,511.00 180,877.00
6 categories in 
each prefecture 
in each year)
*includes base year data 1966.
The above stated totals are in millions of yen and represent deflated 
values.
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Table III
Maximum-Minimum-Mean of Japan’s 
Expenditure Categories
(Long-Run = 46 cases)
Expenditure Category Maximum Minimum Mean Std. Dev.
General Administration 121,350.00 2,340.80 10,423.80 11,950.00
Welfare 343,440.30 3,s7 80.00 20,363.50 30,200.80
Agriculture 219,476.00 5,400.00 28,680.70 17,516.80
Public Works 340,995.80 6,250.30 38,537.20 31,956.00
Police and Fire Protection 317,246.00 2,940.75 13,261.30 25,887.65
Education 402,880.30 9,950.75 51,245.00 50,951.00
GWAPPE (meaned sum of the 1,425,865.00 29,542.00 162,511.00 162,366.00
above 6 categories 
in each prefecture 
in each year)
The above stated totals are in millions of yen and represent deflated values.
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possibilities of the general applicability of this model of internal
33resource allocation to non-market organizations are highly encouraging."
Crecine’s resource allocation procedures are quite similar to Wildavsky's
aids to calculation. Both men applied a set of allocation rules that
may be considered incrementally organized steps. This set of rules support
Lindbloom's hypothesis which maintained that policy problems are fragmented
and dealt with individually rather than comprehensively.
The set of allocation rules which are mentioned by these authors and
others who favor incrementalist descriptions has been adopted as the first
three steps of the budgetary model presented in Table IV. This simple
model assumed that by retaining a proportionality among departmental
budget-shares all involved in the budgetary process are satisfied. the
first three steps in Table IV may be summarized as follows.
tTiIn the first step the h prefecture's chief finance officer formulates
t h
his expenditure estimate for the i administrative unit (department),
from budget resources, j, in year k, by denoting the amount authorized
A
for expenditure in the base year k-1. That is, ^^hijk*
In the second step, the finance officer "satisfices" the prefecture's 
departments spending demands by increasing each estimate on a fixed 
percentage basis. This is done by distributing to each department a "fair- 
share" of the remaining revenue, (REV^^ “ ^^hjk-L^ ’ ^his adjustment 
retains each departments proportion of the budget pie. This proportion, 
a^ _^. , is an empirically estimated parameter which reflects the departments' 
historical budget shares.
During the third step of the resource allocation process the finance
Crecine, oj3. cit. p. 231.
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officer checks the balance between the sum of revised expenditure
tJ 4
estimates, .E_ EXP, . .. , and anticipated revenues, REV, . If a i=L hijk hjk
deficit is calculated the finance officer will eliminate it by allocat­
ing proportional budgetary cuts (fixed percentage cuts) among the 
different prefectural departments., In the case of a surplus, proportional 
spending increases are allocated to the various departments. In this 
resource allocation model, the application of "fair share" strategy 
implies that anticipated revenues equal the sum of revised expenditure 
estimates. This is because the stable share proportions, a ^ ^ » summed 
across all departments necessarily equal unity.
This model is extremely mechanistic due to its inability to consider
executive and legislative reactions to public or other demands for budget
34share alterations. To remedy this deficiency and account for deviations
from the ideal and mechanistic decision-making routine of the computer
model, a measurement (demonstrated budgetary flexibility) has been adopted
from Robert Rickards' study.
To identify DBF, the computer model employs two additional steps
(Table IV). Having produced a balanced budget for year k, the model then 
thcalculates the i department's predicted budget-share, BS. The model
then formulates the differences between observed and predicted budget- 
A
shares, BS, . - BS, . . After the spending recommendations have beenhi3k hijk
allotted the model measures the prefectures' deviations from the stable- 
share rule by calculating the absolute values of the observed and predicted
budget shares,
Ibid., pp. 156-162. Crecine's computer analysis revealed that 
political pressures are not very effective factors in the resource 
allocating process.
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Table IV
Simple, Stable-Share, Resource Allocation Model 
for Measuring Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility
EXP.... _ 
hijk-L hijk
Ef h i j k * REV _) hjk-L
3. E hijk
*• BWI / \
hjk
yes
V
(EXP // REVh .k)
5. I BS, ... - BS . ..hijk hijk
The source for this model was extracted from Robert Rickards' doctoral 
dissertation, p. 83.
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Both short- and long-run analyses of the explanatory variables’ 
relationship with DBF were conducted. The short-run was constructed 
from 460 individual cases; specifically, 46 prefectures over a merged 
time series of 10 annual cross-sections. The long-run consisted of 
46 cases, with each case based on the mean values for each variable, 
for each prefecture, over the ten-year time series.
In Table V the descriptive statistics for long- and short-run DBF 
are presented. The mean percentage change in both analyses has been 
calculated as 2.79 percent. This slight budget share alteration is 
compatible with Campbell's findings. (Table I). This mean percentage 
change demonstrates that in the average' year, the average prefecture 
reallocates less than 3 percent of its budget.
When statistical averages of Japan's 46 prefectures were calculated, 
the annual demonstrated budgetary flexibility appeared extremely stable 
in the long-run. The variation from minimum to maximum change in annual 
budget shares was slightly more than 2 percent. The minimum DBF was 
calculated as 1.79 percent while the maximum budget-share change, was 
only 3.82 percent. Thus, in the long-run, Japanese prefectures' budget- 
shares changed less than 4 percent in every case.
In the short-run, there was much greater variation in the prefectures' 
budget share stability (Table V). The range of budgetary flexibility 
has been measured as nearly 9 percent. The maximum annual budget-share 
change among the prefectures in the short-run is revealed in Table V as 
being 9.01 percent. This is a substantial increase and suggests that 
within some prefectures dynamic budgetary processes are in operation. It 
should be noted that my measurement of annual budget-share change, in 
both the long- and short-runs, has tended to understate DBF. This is
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due to the averaging of eleven categories into six departmental categories. 
By consolodating some categories that were presented in the Japan 
Statistical Yearbooks I have understated DBF. Therefore, in the short 
run, there was greater instability among budget-shares than the 9.01 
percent would indicate.
Table V indicates that budget-share outcomes, at the departmental 
level, are largely compatible with the norm of baransu. The 2.79 percent 
mean change in prefectural budget-share patterns illustrates the pronounced 
emphasis in Japan on fixed-percentage, across-the-board adjustments.
A 2.79 percent mean change is quite an incremental adjustment. The 
maximum change indicated in the short-run (9.01%) probably would not be 
accepted as evidence of incrementalism by most researchers. Therefore, 
while the overall pattern suggests that incremental techniques are popular 
tools in prefectural budgetary strategy there are some individual 
exceptions to the rule.
The simple model employed in this paper does appear to predict 
behavior in both the short- and long-runs for the average prefecture quite 
well. But baransu seems to be much more in evidence in some prefectures 
and some years than in others. The short-run analysis, which depicts 
some large budget-share changes, does indicate that the norm of baransu 
does not pervade every individual budgetary process equally, in every 
prefecture in every year.
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Table V
Long and Short Run Statistics Describing Japan's 
Prefectures Average Annual Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility
(Long-Run = 46 cases)
Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility
DBF = BS, . - BS, .hijk hijk
Minimum Maximum Mean
.0179,(1.79%) .0382 (3.82%) .0279 (2
(Short-Run = 460 cases)
Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility
DBF = I BS, . .. - bK  . ..\ hijk hijk
Minimum 
.0041 (141%)
Maximum Mean
.0901 (9.01%) .0279 (5
79%)
.79%)
CHAPTER IV
EXPLAINING INTERPREFECTURAL VARIATION IN DEMONSTRATED
BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY
In Robert Rickards’ final analysis, three explanatory variables
were revealed to be significantly related to DBF under his general fund
classification. In my study I have also tested general fund expenditures
but have not considered, as does Rickards, total expenditures. The
former classification represents non-capital expenditures that are
covered by general revenue, the latter includes day-to-day operating
expenses which are not covered by general revenue (capital construction
projects, internal transfer payments, etc.) It should be noted that a
prefecture or city may allocate from its general expenditures as it sees
fit, and may more.easily alter departmental budget-shares than it can
35with its total budget.
When I repeated Rickards’ correlation and regression analyses in 
the Japanese setting, all three variables retained their statistical 
significance. The variables which remained important in my research 
measured local resource availability, environmental complexity, and 
interparty competition. These three explanatory variables were measured
35The three explanatory variables in Rickards’ study which proved to 
be significantly related with budgetary flexibility in the general fund 
are: local resource availability, measured as the hypothetical per-capita
yield from per-capita revenue-sharing receipts and from the four major 
local tax basest environmental complexity, measured by the natural log 
of population size; and interparty competition, measured by the percentage 
of votes obtained by the SPD party.
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somewhat differently in my study than in Rickards' dissertation. This 
modification may slightly weaken both the significance of my findings and 
their intersubjective comparability with Rickards' findings. This slight 
modification in the measured techniques of my three significant variables, 
as well as other proposed explanatory variables, was a necessary adjust­
ment. It is not uncommon for a particular computer model, when subjected 
to other environments, to require some measurement modifications.
In Rickards' study local resource availability was measured by 
taxable capacity. My measurement of this variable was quite similar. 
Incomes from private corporations, unincorporated enterprises, and property 
were measured relative to population, as was compensation of employees. 
These four components were subjected to a GNP deflator index and then 
added together. The resulting measurement was then described as local 
resource availability.
Environmental complexity was measured in Robert Rickards' model by 
the natural log of city population size. In my study this variable was 
measured by prefectural populations size. The reason I did not use the 
natural log is because when plotted a downward sloping line was indicated 
whereas Rickards' plot revealed a downward sloping curve. The reason 
for this dissimilarity is the different ranges of population found in the 
two studies. In Germany, the population range of municipalities considered 
in Rickards' research was from 50,000 to 1.3 million. In Japan the 
prefectural population range was from 574,000 to 11.5 million. The 
discrepancy in the two plots may be related to a threshold effect. Once 
an environment gets over a certain size (e.g. 250,000) environemntal 
complexity is no longer geometrically related to population size but rather 
it is arithmetically related. When a small governmental unit increases in
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size, a large increase in environmental complexity also occurs. Yet 
a large governmental unit is already so complex that an increase in 
population does not affect its environmental complexity nearly as much.
Rickards’ measurement of interparty competition was defined as the 
absolute value of 50% - %SPD votes. This measurement of votes was 
necessary in the German study since no information was available on the 
number of seats the SPD had in council. In Germany the percentage of 
votes for the SPD roughly coincides with the party’s proportion of council 
seats. In Japan this estimate is not accurate. In rural areas, indepen­
dent council members tend to vote with the LDP and conservatives simply 
may not run on the LDP label. To avoid this potentially weakening formu­
lation I have measured interparty competition as the absolute value of 
50% - % of LDP seats. The concept is the same but the measurement is 
somewhat different and less reliable due to the fact that some "independents" 
in fact are merely disguised LDP members. We do not know if an independent 
is really a non-label LDP member.
If Robert Rickards’ conclusions concerning the above mentioned variables’ 
relationship with DBF are correct, his findings ought to be broadly dupli­
cated within this study; if his model is to become an empirically valid 
cross-national budgetary indicator. It is my expectations that Rickards’ 
findings will be corroborated within this paper. His analysis revealed 
that as local resource availability increased, DBF also increased. In 
municipalities where resources were totally committed, the ability to ini­
tiate new programs and alter existing budget-shares was found to be minimal. 
Those cities which had a relatively greater capacity to generate revenue 
and realize a resource surplus over their existing commitments were found 
to be more able to engage in discretionary spending and alter their
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existing budget-share patterns.
In his analysis, he found environmental complexity to be inversely 
related to DBF. Budget officials in more complex German municipalities 
were revealed to be less inclined to alter existing interdepartmental 
expenditure priorities. In more populous cities there are greater 
varieties of citizen demands initiated for the available goods and ser­
vices. In big cities, budget-makers are confronted with both higher 
decision costs and more people who want a multitude of specific services. 
Therefore, in such a complex environment, there is a heavier reliance 
on stable share allocation rules than in less complex environments.
Although strong interparty competition might be considered by many 
proponents of democratic ideals to be positively related to increasing 
DBF, Rickards’ study found this relationship to be unfounded. The fact 
that West German political parties do not enter into formal coalitions 
in municipal governments was a decisive factor for the results which 
followed. In more competitive situations no West German municipal party 
was capable of securing a majority of council seats and therefore'a 
political majority to alter established budget-share patterns was lacking. 
Cities which were dominated by a single party in Germany tended to 
demonstrate greater budgetary flexibility. In Japan's prefectures, poli­
tical parties also do not enter into formal coalitions. My findings 
ought to suggest the same relationship between interparty competition and 
DBF as did Rickards’ dissertation.
In order to substantiate the assumed relationship between environ­
mental complexity and budgetary flexibility I have included Table VI 
in this analysis. If population size is indeed a good indicator of environ­
mental complexity, the following correlation table should demonstrate that
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Table VI
Testing the Relationship Between Prefectural Population Size 
and Environmental Complexity
Short-Run Analysis
Correlation Coefficients/Prob R under H0:RH0=0/# of observations
Prefectural
Employees
Prefectural
Employees
1.00000 
0.0000
460
General
Employees
0.95884
0.0001
460
Population
Size
0.93444
0.0001
460
General
Employees
0.95884
0.0001
460
1.00000 
0.0000
460
0.80767
0.0001
460
Population
Size
0.93444
0.0001
460
0.80767
0.0000
460
1.00000 
0.0000
460
GWAPPE 0.85210
0.0001
460
0.77317
0.0001
460
0.81282
0.0001
460
GWAPPE
0.85210
0.0001
460
0.77317
0.0001
460
0.81282
0.0001
460
1.00000
0.0000
460
as population increases the complexity of the decision-making environ­
ment also increases. Increasing environmental complexity involves the 
need to allocate more resources among more competing goals. The variables 
included in this table are all civil servants (prefectural and general 
employees, population size, and the total amount of money spent by the 
prefectures on the six major expenditure categories (GWAPPE). Budget 
size and the number of civil servants are indicators of resources and 
competing budget goals. Civil servants indicate the latter because almost 
all programs require administrative staffs. If the relationships uncovered 
among these variables are highly intercorrelated, the variable population 
size can be accepted as a valid indicator of environmental complexity.
Table VI demonstrates that a high level of intercorrelation does 
exist among the variables included in the correlation matrix. These 
findings seem to substantiate the argument that as population increases 
the complexity of the decision-making environment increases. Prefectures 
with larger population sizes tended to employ more civil servants and to 
spend more money. Thus there was a concurrent increase in the complexity 
of the administrative decision-making process with increased population 
size.
Tables VII and VIII describe the variation in the significant 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable (DBF) in both the short- 
and long-run. The variation in budgetary flexibility has been previously 
discussed in Chapter III. In the following analysis I will concentrate 
on the variation uncovered concerning the three significant explanatory 
variables.
In the short-run (Table VII), a large disparity was found to exist 
between different prefectures,1 local resource availability. It should be
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Table VII
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables
(Short-Run = 460 cases)
Variables Maximum Minimum Mean
Demonstrated
Budgetary Flexibility 09.01 00.41 02.79
Local Resource Availability*
(real yen/capita) 51.924 9.729 24.367
Environmental Complexity
(population size) 11,669,162 568,776 2,296,783 1,039.
Interparty Competition
(50%-% LDP seats) 17.725 0.000 8.525
Std. Dev. 
1.363 
6.525 
848 
4.085
*in millions of yen
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Table VIII
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables
(Long-Run = 46 cases)
Variables Maximum Minimum Mean
Demons trated
Budgetary Flexibility 03.82 01.79 02.79
Local Resource Availability*
(real^yen/capita) 42.245 16.975 24.367
Environmental Complexity
(population size) 11,448,434 574,583 2,296,783 1,046,
Interparty Competition
(50%-% LDP seats) 16.320 2.862 8.525
Std. Dev. 
0.422 
4.638 
413 
3.300
*in millions of yen
noted that all income related variables were subjected to a GNP price 
deflator and thus represent real per capita figures. While the poorest 
prefecture had slightly less than 10 million yen of income to allocate 
among its various departments and expenditure categories, the richest 
prefecture had more than five times the available local resources to 
draw upon. If Rickards’ assertions are correct those cities with greater 
fiscal autonomy (greater local resource availability) ought to demonstrate 
greater budgetary flexibility.
As Table VII indicates, there is a great variation in Japan's 
prefectures’ populations. The maximum population size (Tokyo) was nearly 
12 million while the smallest prefecture (Tottiro) had a population twenty 
times smaller than Tokyo’s (568,776). In order for my finding to substan­
tiate Rickards', larger prefectures should tend to demonstrate a greater 
reluctance to alter existing interdepartmental expenditure priorities 
than smaller prefectures.
In the short-run analysis (Table VII), interparty competition varied 
from a prefecture where the LDP held exactly 50 percent of the council 
seats (0.000) to a prefecture where the LDP was in strong control, holding 
nearly 68 percent of the council seats (17.725). The mean score (8.5), 
or roughly 58.5 percent of the seats, indicates that, on average, the 
LDP can feel quite secure about its dominant position. If Rickards' 
reasoning is correct my findings should show that in prefectures where 
the LDP has a strong control of council seats (less interparty competition 
and thus a higher score on this measure) budget-share patterns are more 
easily altered than in a more competitive situation.
The long-run analysis of these three significant explanatory variables 
(Table VIII) also depicts a great degree of variation among Japanese
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prefectures. The reason why maximum scores dropped and minimum scores 
increased, relative to the short-run, is because of the averaging 
effect adopted for calculating the means of the 46 prefectures, in 
the various variables tested, over the ten-year time-series. To answer 
the questions concerning the conditions under which prefectures ought 
to demonstrate greater budgetary flexibility, the following summary is 
presented. Increasing DBF is associated with higher levels of local 
resource availability, or lower levels of environmental complexity or 
interparty competition. A low interparty competition level is indicated 
by a high score on my measure.
The long-run analysis is statistically more interesting than is the 
short-run. Statistical tables reveal that my long-run analysis is 
capable of explaining 36 percent of the variance while the short-run 
can only explain 12 percent of the variance. This point should be con­
sidered when reading my results.
Table IX and X describe the zero order correlations for the signifi­
cant variables in both the short- and long-run. In Table IX the short- 
run correlation matrix reveals that there is a moderately high level of 
intercorrelation exhibited between local resource availability and environ­
mental complexity. The resulting R (.61140) also indicates that as popu­
lation increases, local resource availability per-capita increases. The 
significance level of this relationship (.0001) is well within the .05 
significance level range.
The variable environmental complexity is not statistically significant 
with DBF (.3227) in the short-run (Table IX). The direction of this 
relationship is opposite to my expectations. If the theoretical relationship 
between DBF and environmental complexity is correct there should be a
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Correlations
Variables
Demonstrated 
Budgetary Flexibility
Local Resource 
Availability
Environmental Complexity
Interparty Competition
Table IX
Zero-Order Correlations 
of the Significant Variables Without Controls
(Short-Run = 460 cases)
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility
1.00000 
0.00000
0.29312
0.0001
0.04621
0.3227
0.09739
0.0368
Local Resource 
Availability
0.29312
0.0001
1.00000
0.0000
0.61140
0.0001
-0.16600
0.0003
Environmental
Complexity
0.04621
0.3227
0.61140
0.0001
1.00000
0.0000
-0.28901
0.0001
Interparty
Competition
0.09739
0.0368
-0.16600
0.0003
-0.28901
0.0001
1.00000
0.0000
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Correlations
Variables
Demonstrated 
Budgetary Flexibility
Local Resource 
Availability -
Environmental Complexity
Interparty Competition
Table X
Zero-Order Correlations 
of the Significant Variables Without Controls
(Long-Run = 46 cases)
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility
1.00000
0.0000
0.36793
0.0119
0.08362
0.5806
0.23016
0.1239
Local Resource 
Availability
0.36793
0.0119.
1.00000
0.0000
0.83910
0.0001
-0.24622
0.0990
Environmental
Complexity
0.08362
0.5806
0.83910
0.0001
1.00000 
0.0000
-0.34018
0.0207
Interparty
Competition
0.23016
0.1239
-0.24622
0.0990
-0.34018
0.0207
1.00000
0.0000
^Significance level at .05
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negative sign in front of 0.04621 because Rickards' findings indicate 
that there is an inverse relationship between the two variables. As 
environmental complexity increases budgetary flexibility should decrease. 
The reason for environmental complexity's described relationship with 
DBF in Table IX may be due to the failure to control for the effects of 
the other explanatory variables.
In Table IX, the significance level (0.0368) and the correlation 
coefficient (R) for interparty competition (0.09739) do give credance 
to the theory which I have previously expounded. Although there is a 
negative relationship between this variable and DBF the resulting R is 
positive because of my measurement technique. A positive association 
reveals that as interparty competition decreases demonstrated budgetary 
flexibility increases.
Table X includes the long-run analysis of the significant variables.
As in the short-run table, a high level of intercorrelation between 
local resource availability and environmental complexity (.83910) is 
revealed. The significance level (.0001) of this relationship remained 
strong in the long-run. Local resource availability's relationship with 
DBF remained quite similar to the short-run analysis.
The relationship between environmental complexity and DBF was again 
found not to be statistically significant (.5806), and the direction of 
this relationship was still opposite to that suggested by theory. However, 
before concluding that this assertion of Robert Rickards is invalid in 
the Japanese context, I will control for the other explanatory variables.
In Table X rising interparty competition remained negatively related 
to DBF (as interparty competition rises budgetary flexibility decreases), 
but the significance level (0.1239) deteriorated. The validity of the
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findings suggested in Tables IX and X will be tested by controlling 
for potential contaminating elements (second-order correlations).
In Tables XI and XII the correlation between the dependent variable 
(DBF) and each significant explanatory variable, controlling for the 
other two explanatory variables, is examined. These second-order 
correlations are both more significant and informative than the previous 
correlation tables because the effects of the other explanatory variables 
are not allowed to contaminate the true relationship between DBF and each 
individual explanatory variable.
The results depicted in Table XI indicate that the other explanatory 
variables were indeed contaminating the results in the short-run analysis. 
Local resource availability remained significant (0.000) and its R (0.3357) 
suggest that it is the strongest candidate predictor of DBF.
When both local resource availability and interparty competition were 
controlled, environmental complexity became both statistically significant 
(0.001) and its correlation coefficient became negative (-0.1445). The 
data supports the theoretical proposition which Rickards' had drawn from 
his study of West German municipalities. As environmental complexity 
decreases DBF increases.
Table XI also reveals that interparty competitions R is much stronger 
than short-run zero-order correlation revealed (0.1179). The statistical 
significance of this variable also increased dramatically to .006 from a 
previous zero-order significance of .0368. The contaminating influence 
in this case was mostly from environmental complexity’s negative association 
with interparty competition. When this negative association was controlled 
for interparty competition was revealed as a much better predictor of DBF 
than it was previously portrayed to be in the zero-order short-run analysis
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Table XI
Second-Order Correlations 
Correlations Between Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility and 
Each Explanatory Variable, Controlling for the 
Other Two Explanatory Variables
(Short-Run - 460 cases)
Variables
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility
Demonstrated 
Budgetary Flexibility
1.00000
0.0000
Local Resource 
Availability
0.3357
0.0000
Environmental Complexity ■0.1445
0.001
Interparty Competition 0.1179
0.006
*Significance level at .05
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Table XII
Second-Order Correlations 
Correlations Between Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility and 
Each Explanatory Variable, Controlling for the Other Two
Explanatory Variables
(Long-Run = 46 cases)
Variables
Demonstrated 
Budgetary Flexibility
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility
1.0000 
0.000
Local Resource 
Availability
0.5511
0.000
Environmental Complexity 
Interparty Competition
-0.3925
0.004
0.2807
0.032
*Significance level at .05
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(Table IX).
The long-run second-order correlation (Table XII) also indicates 
that my zero-order results were weakened by contamination from the 
uncontrolled explanatory variables. In the long-run, the strength of 
local resource availability’s correlation increased from a zero-order R 
of .36793 to a second-order R of .5511. Its statistical significance also 
increased markedly from .0119 to .000.
As in the short-run, the second-order correlation of environmental 
complexity with DBF became negative (-0.3925) and thus theoretically 
justifiable. Its statistical significance level also increased dramatically 
from a zero-order level of .5806 to a second-order level of .004.
Table XII shows that interparty competition’s R value remained almost 
identical to its zero-order correlation coefficient (.2807). Yet its 
statistical significance rose from .1239 to .032.
In both the short- and long-run second-order correlations, all three 
explanatory variables were revealed as being both statistically more 
significant and having higher correlation coefficients than they did in 
the uncontrolled zero-order tables. These findings support Robert Rickards’ 
theories concerning budgetary flexibility and its relationship to the 
three significant explanatory variables considered in both of our studies. 
The preceding analysis has further confirmed the theoretical relationship 
between DBF and local resource availability, environmental complexity, 
and interparty competition. The results of this analysis may be summarized 
as follows. As local resource availability increases, prefectures are 
better able to redistribute budget resources and change budget-share 
patterns. DBF is positively associated with rising local resource availabi­
lity. As environmental complexity increases the prefectures’ budgetary
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finance officers’ decision-making environment becomes more complex due 
to the increasing number of citizen demands, governmental employees, 
and the amount of money to be spent on various expenditure categories.
In such a complex environment, budget-share patterns are less easily 
altered. The results in this chapter have also shown that in a more 
competitive political situation, where no single party can muster a 
majority,, budget-shares are less flexible than in a less competitive 
situation.
Regression analyses of these significant variables are presented 
in Tables XIII and XIV. Table XIII reveals that the short-run model 
is capable of accounting for 12.65 percent of the interprefectural 
differences in DBF (RSQR = .1265). In Table XIV the long-run is shown 
as being able to account for 36.12 percent of the interprefectural 
differences in DBF (RSQR = .3612). While the short-run can only explain 
a little of the variance the long-run is capable of explaining a good 
amount of the variance. The reasons why I am able to account for such 
a small amount of variance in the short-run is because of the greater 
influence on this model of many undefined variables. To the extent that 
these undefined variables' effects are random, they should offset one 
another in the long-run, enhancing the values of my three explanatory 
variables. The evidence indicates that this capability of the long-run 
to explain more of the variance is the case in my analysis.
The beta weights of the explanatory variables measures each one’s
contribution to the variance explained in the short- and long-run. In
Table XIII the beta weight of local resource availability indicates that
it is the most useful of the three explanatory variables, accounting for
36
58 percent of the explained variance.
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Table XIII
Short-Run Regression of Demonstrated Budgetary 
Flexibility on Local Resource Availability, Environmental 
Complexity, and Interparty Competition
n=460 mult-, r = .35565 RSQR = .1265 Root MSE = .025560 
Dep. Mean = .005845 F = 22.010
Standard
Variable B Beta Error B
Local Resource
Availability .8793771D-01 .42100“ .01155 57.928
Environmental
Complexity -.2328930D-06 -.17769 .00000 9.725
Interp^arty
Competition 738655320D-01 .11592 .01525 6.428
Prob T 
.0001 
7 0019 
.0116
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Table XIV
Long-Run Regression of Mean Demonstrated 
Budgetary Flexibility on Mean Values of Local 
Resource Availability, Environmental Complexity, and 
Interparty Competition
n=46 mult, r = .60130 RSQR = .3612 Root MSE = .006981
Dep. Mean = .055845 F = 7.917
Standard
Variable B Beta Error B F
Local Resource
Availability .8852304D-01 .97319 .02068 18.319
Envi ronmen t a1
Complexity -.2613509D-06 -.64818 .00000 7.650
Prob. T
.0001
.0084
Interparty
Competition .2961381D-01 .24928 .01563 3.592 .0650
52
Environmental complexity was consistently the second strongest 
predictor in the short-run regression, as it had been in the previous 
tables. Both its beta weight and significance level (.0019) reconfirmed 
its theoretical relationship with DBF. Interparty competition also 
remained significant in Table XIII.
In Table XIV the three explanatory variables retained their propor­
tional predictive capabilities with local resource availability again 
having the highest beta weight (52 percent) and strongest statistical 
significance (.0001). The fact that interparty competition has a 
significance score of .065 should not be taken as depicting its statistical 
invalidity . This decline in significance is due in part to the increased 
explanatory power of the other two explanatory variables in the long-run. 
Another reason for this decline is the imprecise measurement : 
technique employed for this variable. It is not known how many indepen­
dent seat holders really are disguised LDP numbers.
This chapter has helped define the relationship between DBF and the 
explanatory variables. An increase in DBF results from either an increase 
in local resource availability or a decrease in environmental complexity 
or interparty competition. In the short run, the beta weights indicate
During the development of this thesis a number of proposed 
explanatory variables were tested for their relationship with budgetary 
flexibility. Of these variables only three were found to be statistically 
significant (the same variables which Rickards found to be significant in 
his general fund analysis). A number of other explanatory variables were 
discarded from my study because of their high intercorrelation with my 
measurement of local resource availability. These discarded variables 
measured local taxes, shared taxes, and treasury disbursements. These 
variables may serve as potential indicators of further significant 
relationships with demonstrated budgetary flexibility. A computer model 
where local resource availability is controlled for, in relation to these 
discarded variables, might uncover some important relationships between 
these three variables and budget-share flexibility.
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that local resource availability is nearly 2.5 times stronger a predictor 
of DBF than is environmental complexity, and nearly 4 times better at 
predicting DBF than is interparty competition. Clearly the policy 
variable for national-level officials to manipulate in order to increase 
prefectural demonstrated budgetary flexibility is local resource availabi­
lity. One way this might be done is by the national government supplying 
lower interest loans for private corporation construction projects in 
low DBF prefectural areas.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Local resource availability remained the strongest predictor of 
demonstrated budgetary flexibility in both the short- and long-run 
analysis. The evidence presented in the statistical tables supports 
the argument that prefectures with higher levels of local resource 
availability tend to demonstrate higher levels of budget-share flexibi­
lity.
Aaron Wildavsky’s research corroborates the importance of economic
wealth to budgetary strategy. He has indicated that economic wealth
(local resource availability) is one of the most significant influences
37on American cities’ budgeting behavior. The relative level of economic 
resources is indeed the decisive factor underlying Japanese prefectures’ 
propensity to deviate from established budget-share patterns.
My findings support the view that wealthy prefectures are more apt 
to shift departmental budget-shares than are poorer prefectures. A 
possible explanation for this conclusion is the perceived cost of changing 
the budget-share strategy to accomodate a disproportional increase in 
a particular department. In wealthy prefectures the high level of local 
resource availability minimizes the absolute losses which advocates of 
alternative budget-share patterns must accept. This minimization of losses
37Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
Processes, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), pp. 114-135.
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tends to decrease political opposition to beginning these altered 
budget strategies. This information implies that the norm of baransu 
is more readily identifiable with some prefectures, in some years, 
than it is in others. The more wealthy a prefecture is the less its 
budget strategy will conform to baransu.
Environmental complexity also proved to be statistically significant 
to DBF in both the short- and long-run analyses. The data introduced 
in Chapter IV indicate that officials in more complex environments are 
less inclined to alter existing budget-share patterns across departments. 
Environmental complexity seems to cause decision-makers to depend more 
heavily on calculation aids and historical precedents.
This finding has been implied within John Campbell’s research 
concerning Japan’s national budgetary behavior. Campbell states that 
government finance officers rely on stable-share rules for allocating 
resources among administrative units because of the complexity of the 
decision-making process. This reasoning supports my finding that large 
prefectures are more dependent on stable-share rules because of their 
intricate and cumbersome environments.
John Crecine has stated that population is unrelated to a city’s 
reliance on incremental strategies.
"A smaller city is faced with somewhat less complex problems 
involving fewer variables and interrelationships. This simpli­
fication is more than offset by the fact that the small cities 
also have fewer sources of information and computational abilities. 
My research findings do not substantiate Crecine’s reasoning that budget-
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share patterns are independent of population size. Crecine’s study 
concentrated on only a few large American cities. Because of this 
reliance on large cities, his analysis did not include a large variation 
in population sizes. Crecine should have checked his model on some 
smaller cities before pronouncing his conclusion concerning the relation­
ship between environmental complexity and population size.
In Japan’s prefectures, as in Germany's municipalities, the more 
competitive a party system is, the greater is its reluctance to depart 
from established budget-share patterns. This finding - - that a positive 
relationship exists among decreasing interparty competition and increas­
ing flexibility - - runs counter to the" conclusions of some preceding 
39studies. It should be noted that, due to the measurement technique 
employed, when the measure increases in value, competition is decreasing.
Gerald Wright suggests that municipal governments with greater inter­
party competition are more sensitive to public opinion demands calling for 
alterations in the budget-share patterns. Basic democratic theory implies 
that competition in the political spectrum ought to increase the representa­
tiveness, and consequently flexibility, of governmental resource allocation 
procedures. My findings have demonstrated that competition actually reduces 
budgetary-flexibility in Japan’s prefectures.
In Japan, as in Germany, political parties at the prefectural or
40municipal level do not enter into formal coalitions. Therefore in a
strongly competitive political race where the LDP does not have an effective
39Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "Interparty Competition and State Social 
Welfare Policy: When A Difference makes a Difference," Journal of
Politics, (August, 1975), pp. 796-803.
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majority, no political party is able to control a majority of the council 
seats. In such a situation the consensus necessary for altering established 
budget-share patterns is not likely to develop. In both Japan and 
Germany, prefectures or municipalities with less interparty competition 
tend to demonstrate greater budgetary flexibility.
Although this study does not purport to be an in-depth comparative 
analysis, Table XV offers a summary investigation of both mine and Robert 
Rickards’ statistical findings. When the beta weights were calculated 
for the three explanatory variables both studies indicated that local 
resource availability was the strongest predictor of DBF. In my study 
this variable was capable of explaining 52 percent of the models explainable 
variance while in Rickards' study.this variable was capable of explaining 
43 percent of his model’s explainable variance. A model’s explainable 
variance is only a proportion (36.12 percent in my long-run analysis) of 
the actual variance. The beta weights also illustrate that environmental 
complexity was the second best indicator of DBF in both studies.
Table XV also demonstrates that local resource availability retained 
its predominant statistical correlation significance in both studies.
While my R measurement is somewhat stronger (.5511) than Rickards' (.4477) 
both are extremely significant. Both my correlation coefficient for 
environmental complexity (-.3925) and Rickards' (-.3206) depict the negative 
relationship of this variable to DBF. My interparty competition score 
(.2807) is nearly identical to Rickards correlation statistic (.2668). 
both of our findings support the relationship between increasing DBF and 
decreasing interparty competition. The extent of interparty competition 
is defined in both studies by the same equational formulation. Perfect 
interparty competition is denoted by a score of 0 percent and a one-party
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Table XV
Comparative Summary of the Relationship Uncovered 
Between Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility and the 
Three Explanatory Variables in both Japan's Prefectural 
Governments and West German Municipalities:
Long-Run -Analysis of the General Fund
 _____ Prefectural Data___________
N = 46
Correlation
Variables Beta F Coefficient
Local
Resource .97319 18.319 0.5511
Availability
Environmental
Complexity -.64818 7.650 -0.3925
Interparty
Competition .24928 3.592 0.2807
______ German Municipalities Data_____
N = 105
Correlation
Variables Beta F Coefficient
Local
Resource .51236 55.173 0.4477
Availability
Environmental
Complexity -.46943 44.879 -0.3206
Interparty
Competition .19466 7.742 0.2668
The data for my German municipalities table was extracted from Robert 
Rickards1 diesertation entitled: Non-Routine Decision Making, pp. 186,
219, 237.
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monopoly by a score of 50 percent. The findings in Table XV are 
encouraging indications of Robert Rickards’ model’s cross-national 
validity.
While, for the most part, my conclusions have substantiated
Campbell’s findings that Japan follows an incremental budget strategy
(Table I), there is one point which is not entirely compatible with his.
Campbell has stated that the LDP’s effect on Japan’s national budget
tends to increase the stability among ministries' budget-shares. "The
net effect of LDP participation has actually been to increase inertia
41by inhibiting attacks on backward-looking expenditures."
My research indicates that Japanese prefectural governments like 
their national counterpart, rely on aids-to-calculation when formulating 
their budget strategy. Yet the effects of the LDP on the prefectural 
budget strategy does appear to be more complex than Campbell contends.
Those prefectures which exhibited less interparty competition demonstrated 
greater budgetary flexibility. Therefore, while the overall effect of 
the LDP may tend to be to inhibit conflict and maintain a consensus among 
budgetary participants, it also seems to play a dynamic non-incremental 
role in those prefectures which exhibit weak interparty competition.
Within this thesis I have tested the theoretical assumptions proposed 
by Robert Rickards., By applying his model to another culture and nation, 
and to a different level of government, my findings help to substantiate 
the empirical validity of his assumptions. The intersubjective comparability 
of these two national studies should increase the significance of any 
future cross-national comparisons. It is my recommendation that Robert
^Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics, p. 275.
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Rickards’ budgetary model be applied to a variety of other national 
contexts. Only through a number of case studies can these budgetary 
assumptions be more accurately tested and documented.
One idea for future research which has been generated by this analysis 
concerns the relationship between DBF and interparty competition. Do 
one-party states demonstrate more budgetary flexibility than do two-party 
or multiparty democracies? Are coalitions imperative to democratic 
party systems if they are to be more respondent to citizens’ demands for 
alterations in the budget-share patterns? I believe that these questions 
could lead to some useful theoretical analyses and may prove to be quite 
interesting to future researchers.
In conclusion; the budget-share patterns at the Japanese prefectural 
level are largely compatible with the norm of baransu over the long-run 
analysis. The short-run analysis has indicated that there are frequent 
exceptions to the norm of baransu. Nevertheless, in both the short-run 
and long-run, the conditions which are most predictive of a prefecture’s 
reliance and existing budget-share patterns, incremental aids to 
calculation, and baransu techniques, have been demonstrated as being:
1) a relatively low level of local resource availability, 2) a high level 
of environmental complexity, 3) a high level of interparty competition.
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